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ARTICLE
Discursive continuity and change in the time of Covid-19: the 
case of EU cybersecurity policy
Helena Carrapicoa and Benjamin Farrandb
aCriminology and International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, Northumbria University, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK; bReader in Law and Emerging Technologies, Newcastle University, Law School. 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK
Abstract
This article explores the extent to which Covid-19 has impacted the 
trajectory of EU Cybersecurity Policy. The Covid-19 crisis has led to 
an unprecedent reliance on digital solutions, ranging from tele-
working to virus-tracking systems, resulting in the proliferation of 
Covid-19 related cybercrime, critical information infrastructure 
attacks and dissemination of pandemic disinformation. Although 
the virus has been repeatedly portrayed as life altering and as 
having considerably increased the cybersecurity risks faced by 
States, businesses and citizens, the proposed solutions, however, 
have accelerated existing trends in the field rather than resulting in 
significant institutional change. In particular, there has been a 
reinforcement of the role as a coordinating actor, of the introduc-
tion of further coherence between sub-areas and instruments, and 
of the positioning of public-private partnerships at the heart of the 
policy. However, where the role of social media platforms in facil-
itating the spread of disinformation is concerned, a changing trust 
relationship has resulted in a discursive shift in which these plat-
forms require greater oversight, a belief reinforced by the spread of 
Covid-19 disinformation. The article proposes, through the lenses of 
historical and discursive institutionalism, that the EU’s response to 
Covid-19 in the field of cybersecurity can only be understood in 
light of these pre-existing trends, which are the result of an eco-
nomic and security path dependence that emerged in the 1980s.
Keywords 




European Union (EU) Cybersecurity is a comparatively new field, which has moved from 
playing a minor supporting role in European integration to becoming its own distinct 
policy area in 2013. Growing from an ad hoc set of Single Market protection mechanisms 
to a fully realised agenda with its own internal rationale, cybersecurity is now central to 
the EU’s integration efforts, with transversal effect on most other policy areas. It covers 
a range of activities, including the protection of critical information systems and infra-
structures from cyber-attacks, the prevention and investigation of cybercrime, and cyber- 
defence. Similarly, in the context of the current pandemic, uses of digital communications 
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technologies have proliferated, raising both the profile and importance of cybersecurity in 
supporting modern social, economic and political life. As reliance on digital communica-
tions has increased, so too have the opportunities for actors to abuse these technologies 
for political and economic gain.
Bearing this background in mind, this article asks whether Covid-19 has resulted in 
ideational change in the EU’s cybersecurity policy, or whether we instead see ideational 
and policy continuity. For the purpose of this article, we propose that continuity involves 
the following three elements: 1) ideational continuity- is there a shift is the underlying 
philosophy and justification of EU cybersecurity policy choices?-, 2) policy continuity- is 
there a re-orientation/interruption of existing instruments?-, and 3) governance continu-
ity- is the field governed in the same way, and are the relations between the different 
actors present in this field maintained? (for further suggestions of how to measure and 
analise change, please see Wolff and Ladi 2020). Through an approach that draws from 
both historical and discursive institutionalisms, the article argues that the historical and 
discursive context in which EU Cybersecurity policy emerges and develops directly shapes 
the development of the policy itself, as well as the behaviour of actors present within the 
policy (Schmidt 2008; Steinmo 2008). By exploring the discourses at the origins of the 
policy, the article proposes that the development and formalisation of EU cybersecurity is 
the result of ideational path-dependence based in economic and security rationales that 
have reoriented during critical junctures. EU cybersecurity is best understood as evolving 
through a gradual layering of institutions and policies and through critical junctures, 
rather than exclusively as the result of either. The article concludes that while the 
pandemic has had a dramatic impact on daily life, it has not resulted in a significant 
discursive shift in cybersecurity, but rather in reinforcing existing narrative trends (for 
another example of policy continuity in times of Covid-19, please see Wolff, Ripoll Servent, 
and Piquet 2020).
In particular, the spread of online disinformation has resulted in a ‘bifurcation’ in the 
levels of trust placed in different actors involved in providing cybersecurity, with social 
media platforms deemed as not sharing the EU’s values regarding freedom of expression 
and harmful speech, which is exacerbated by the proliferation of pandemic-related 
conspiracy theories. This EU cybersecurity case study aims to contribute to the historical 
institutionalism literature by demonstrating how it can be enriched through engagement 
with discursive institutionalism’s focus on how ideas and discourse facilitate institutional 
change (for a more in-depth discussion on neo-institutionalist analytical frameworks and 
a defence of methodological pluralism, please see Schmidt 2020). It does so by presenting 
the development of EU cybersecurity through historiographical analysis, reframing the 
genesis, formalisation and current acceleration of EU Cybersecurity in light of the under-
lying philosophies that shape its programmes and policies, and identifying patterns of 
change and continuity.
Understanding EU cybersecurity policy through the lenses of historical and 
discursive institutionalism
In order to understand institutional change within EU cybersecurity policy, the authors 
propose combining the insights of historical institutionalism, in particular the elements of 
path dependence, critical junctures and gradual institutional change, with those of the 
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more recent discursive institutionalism, namely the focus on the role of ideas and 
discourse. This section of the article explains how the discursive institutionalist analytical 
framework complements the historical institutionalist materialist toolbox to fully under-
stand the ideas present at the origin and throughout the development of EU cybersecur-
ity policy, their discursive framing, and their shaping of this policy’s design and trajectory, 
in order to shed light onto the impact of Covid-19.
Historical institutionalism is concerned with the way institutional structures evolve 
over time and how this shapes their present assemblages and their surroundings 
(Fioretos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2018). It explains institutional evolution by depicting 
it as the result of ‘path dependence’. Current institutions are the result of past 
developments and policy decisions, which delimit the spectrum of current and future 
options (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). This institutional inheritance, or ‘path- 
dependence’, constrains institutional configurations and the preferences of the indi-
viduals within them (Peters 2019). According to this view, the same exogenous 
phenomenon can lead to a very different impact on similar and comparable institu-
tions due to the historical paths these institutions have taken. Institutional trajectories, 
however, can shift paths at specific moments in time when they reach ‘critical 
junctures’. Defined by Collier and Collier as periods of considerable change, that 
may play out differently in distinct settings, critical junctures’ impact on path depen-
dence is expected to vary according to their length, timing and effect (1991). A critical 
juncture has the capacity to alter the trajectory of an institution by producing a new 
legacy in the form of novel ideas and antecedents for decision-making, which in turn 
will delimit future behaviour (Ladi 2011). We argue, however, that critical junctures 
alone are not able to account for all forms of institutional change, gradual processes 
also playing an important role in understanding the evolution of EU policies (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005): critical junctures serve as windows of opportunity for deeper 
reforms that produce path dependence, which frame the everyday micro changes 
that continue to take place and that equality contribute towards changing institu-
tional trajectories, although in a less perceptible way. As the subsequent sections of 
this article will demonstrate, gradual changes in EU cybersecurity-related institutions 
are best understood through the mode of ‘layering’ – where new institutions are 
added on top of older ones (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).
Is it possible, however, to fully understand the reasons behind institutional change by 
simply tracking the evolution in procedures, norms, routines and conventions? Following on 
the steps of Schmidt’s critique of historical institutionalism (Schmidt 2010, 2008), this article 
also argues that even though this approach offers important tools to comprehend how 
change occurs, its understanding of institutions has often tended to ignore the role of ideas 
and their discursive framing in contributing to that change. By overlooking ideas and their 
expression, historical institutionalism has in fact prioritised a materialistic and deterministic 
understanding of institutions, focusing on their design rather than ideational content, resulting 
in their representation as structures where agents’ meaning constructs play a limited part. It 
may be possible to identify the ‘path dependence’ that is shaping the trajectory of EU 
cybersecurity policy, and it might also be possible to pinpoint critical junctures and gradual 
changes in this area, but if we do not uncover the ideas that constitute it, the way they are 
communicated, and trace their influence, we are certainly missing a key part of the answer to 
the puzzle. In order to counter this gap, Schmidt has proposed a fourth strain of new 
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institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, which underlines that the discursive expression of 
ideas has power in itself (2008, 2002). By shaping agents’ perceptions of their social, political, 
and economic reality, ideas1 and discourse2 are key to understanding how interests, values, 
and behaviours evolve, and why institutions change.
The analytical framework created by Schmidt for capturing the role of ideas and discourse in 
institutional change is therefore particularly useful to understand that critical junctures emerge 
as periods of change because they are discursively framed as such, and that the constraints of 
path dependence are the result of inherited ideas and discourses that are constantly re- 
interpreted in light of the contemporary context. According to Schmidt, in order to understand 
how ideas and discourse constitute path dependence and frame change, we need to further 
explore the different roles that ideas can adopt in policy-making. These can be categorised 
according to a three-level Matryoshka doll system, characterised by processes of ideational 
legacy, alignment and coherence. The first doll creates an ideational outer shell made up of 
‘philosophies’- worldviews or ideologies- that serve as a capsule for the second doll, composed 
of ‘programmes’- where philosophies are applied to specific policy fields and translated into 
underlying principles and strategic guidance. The third and most inner doll corresponds to the 
‘policies’ that result from the practical application of philosophies and programmes (2008). This 
article proposes to apply this framework by identifying the implicit philosophic ideas shaping 
EU cybersecurity path dependence and change, in order to understand how they resulted in 
ideationally aligned programmes and policies, which in turn allows us to understand the 
impact of Covid-19 on this field.
The origins and formalisation of EU cybersecurity policy
Combining historical institutionalism with discursive institutionalism, the second section of 
this article will now explore the emergence and formalisation of EU cybersecurity policy. It will 
use Schmidt’s ideational categorisation in order to pinpoint this policy’s foundational philo-
sophies, tracing its discursive path dependence, and identifying the critical junctures and 
gradual change that have shaped programmes and policies. It proposes to sub-divide EU 
cybersecurity policy’s path into two main phases: 1) genesis (1980 to 2010) and 2) formalisation 
(2010–2020). The purpose of this section is to explain that the EU cybersecurity policy’s 
response to Covid-19, namely in terms of its relationship with the private sector, its prioritisa-
tion of resilience and combating disinformation, and the EU’s coordinating role, cannot be 
understood as a reaction to an exogenous shock, but rather needs to be situated in a much 
wider ideational and discursive historical context.
Genesis: from safeguarding the single market to protecting EU citizens
The European Community’s initial interest in cybersecurity in the 1980s was deeply embedded 
in an economic approach concerning Single Market protection in the context of new technol-
ogies, which would deeply influence the development of subsequent programmes and 
policies, and in particular, its view that cybersecurity is best governed through public-private 
partnerships. This security concern was reflected in international level discourses, with the 
Council of Europe’s proposal to create the category of computer crime in the early 1980s, as 
well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Group 
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of Eight (G8)’s initiatives recommending the creation and harmonization of European compu-
ter crime legislation in the mid-1980s (Deflem and Shutt 2006).
Despite the predominance of this security discourse at the international level, how-
ever, the European Community, which lacked legal competence in this field, followed 
a different path. Although we can observe a transfer from the international level to the 
European one in terms of the concern with computer and network crime, its framing 
was not embedded within a security philosophy but an economic one. This underlying 
discourse focused on the centrality of free trade and private initiative in bringing 
prosperity to European countries, as well as on the European Community’s role in 
regulating the legal environment enabling healthy market competition (European 
Commission 1985). Information and communication technologies were presented as 
both the Single Market’s future, but also its Achilles’ heel, as their abuse by foreign 
powers and individual criminals could seriously undermine economic development, 
distorting the functioning of the internal market (European Commission 1993). This 
economic philosophy would mark the start of a path dependence that would shape the 
development of this area, with programmes and policies focusing on the protection of 
information and communication technologies as a crucial element of economic prosper-
ity (European Commission 1990).
As it became clear that compensatory security mechanisms and instruments were 
necessary to protect the open borders of the Single Market, a security discourse 
stemming from the development of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar started to 
permeate the EU’s approach to cybersecurity (Carrapico and Farrand 2017). This spil-
lover from the economic field to the security one opened a window of opportunity for 
the first critical juncture in cybersecurity’s trajectory, changing the economic-focused 
path dependence that had been established in the early 1980s. The possibility of 
developing European instruments, coupled with the growing perception that computer 
crime constituted an emerging threat in a context of continuous uncertainty, enabled 
a new hybrid philosophy to surface, focusing on the role of information technologies in 
the facilitation of insecurity of the European Union and its citizens, and going much 
beyond the economic impact. The result was a hybrid economic/security discourse that 
would allow for security-focused concerns to shape future programmes and policies. By 
the mid-1990s, European institutions were already expressing a sense of urgency in 
addressing illegal and harmful content on the Internet (European Council 1996), as well 
as the use of information technologies by organised criminals (Council of the European 
Union 1997).
On the basis of this hybrid philosophy, and as an answer to the sense of urgency, there 
were a number of programmatic ideas, or guiding principles, developed between the late 
1990s and the mid-2000s: 1) the projection of the EU as a coordinating actor that is well- 
placed to address transborder cybersecurity problems (European Council 1999), 2) the 
need to focus on resilience as a strategy to protect information networks and infrastruc-
tures (Council of the European Union 2005), 3) the importance of achieving coherence 
between EU actions and instruments in an area that is particularly diverse (European 
Commission 1999); and, 4) the centrality of working with the private sector given its 
ownership of information infrastructures and its perceived expertise (European 
Commission 2001). The resulting policies included a gradually expanding network of 
very diverse measures, clearly working through a layering process, including the 
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introduction of a European warning and information system (CERT), increasing research 
support for information technology, encouraging Member States to adopt similar cyber 
security norms, creating a European cybersecurity agency (ENISA), and raising the popu-
lations’ awareness of cyber vulnerabilities.
Although this field has evolved through a layering process, where new ideas, norms 
and instruments have been gradually added on top of existing ones, with a clear path 
dependence shaped by a hybrid economic/security philosophy, there has also been an 
important role played by external factors, including events and policy dynamics external 
to this specific field. Where the latter is concerned, there has been a clear relation between 
the development of the Third Pillar, and later on of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, and EU cybersecurity policy both in terms of the underlying philosophies and of 
spillover from other JHA policies. Policy makers’ perceptions of external events have also 
contributed to the evolution of this policy, namely the growing number of cyber-attacks, 
as well as terrorist attacks where information technology played an important role. The 
case of the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks are particularly important as they 
opened up the window of opportunity for the area’s second critical juncture. Although 
there is no change at the level of the underlying philosophy, there is a very important shift 
in programmatic terms, justified on the basis of the level of threat, with the EU moving 
from a soft law approach to a much more formalised approach, characterised by binding 
instruments and the creation of a dedicated policy area (Fahey 2014).
The formalisation of EU cybersecurity policy
The formalisation of cybersecurity as a distinct policy domain began in 2010 with the 
release of the Internal Security Strategy (European Commission 2010a). Initial proposals in 
the field of cybersecurity were gradualist in nature, with reforms proposed to supplement 
the initiatives being developed in the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe (European 
Commission 2010b). This programme aimed to address the fragility of the EU’s economies 
through measures to facilitate the creation of a ‘Digital’ Single Market (European 
Commission 2010b, 3–6). Trust and confidence in the online environment was identified 
as a policy problem to be addressed, yet whereas historically this was framed almost 
exclusively in terms of threats from cybercrime, we see a ‘layering’ effect as the Digital 
Agenda outlines that cybercrime is not only an issue of economically-driven activity, but 
can also be political, discursively employing the example of cyber-attacks against infor-
mation systems in Estonia, Lithuania and Georgia that requires a cybersecurity approach 
rather than an exclusive focus on cybercrime (European Commission 2010b, 16).
The Internal Security Strategy incorporated the reinforcement of existing agencies such as 
Europol with expanded competences in the field of cybercrime through a European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3), and increased public-private partnership through ENISA to develop 
standards of best practice for cyber-attack resilience (European Commission 2010a, 9–10). The 
underlying ideational framework of the EU as coordinator, with expert-led public-private 
cooperation, and an emphasis on resilience and coherence of policies is evident in these 
documents. Rather than representing a critical juncture, it is a gradualist approach to cyberse-
curity policy formalisation, working within existing institutional structures to facilitate an 
expansion of actions, rather than radically rethinking them.
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By 2013, this proposal had become a full, self-contained policy. Interestingly, the 
resulting Cybersecurity Strategy brought together the three former pillars of the EU in 
a comprehensive approach to online security issues, mimicking its pillar structure through 
measures intending on protecting the internal market by combating cybercrime, ensuring 
resilience for Network and Information Systems and Critical Information Infrastructures 
within the framework of cybersecurity, as well as introducing the concept of cyber- 
defence within the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (European 
Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 2013). The Cybersecurity Strategy continues this gradualist approach of 
layering, however, with the establishment of expanded competences for agencies such as 
ENISA, calls for reinforced cooperation between national authorities, private sector online 
service providers and security experts, and increased coordination between the national 
and European levels as well as between the EU agencies in order to ensure coherence. In 
this respect, the underlying ideational framework remains consistent, with an emphasis 
predominantly on the importance of the EU economy with some recognition of non- 
economic drivers of cyber-attacks, with a continuing path-dependency based in ideas of 
coordination, coherence and the role of technical experts as ‘problem solvers’. As a result, 
while we see the establishment of a standalone European Cybersecurity Strategy, this 
does not appear to be the result of an identifiable exogenous shock, but endogenous 
change as the result of accelerating and deepening trends in an environment of ideational 
continuity.
Ideational rupture: social media platforms, disinformation and a loss of trust
Whereas the period 2010–2016 constituted one of relative continuity, the period 
2016–2019 can be considered one of ideational disruption. In April 2016, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission 
published a Communication on Hybrid Threats (European Commission and High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016). The EU was 
framed as facing a changed threat landscape, with blurring lines between state and non- 
state, and economically-motivated and politically-motivated attacks. While the underlying 
philosophy of risk formulating the programme of resilience remains, the narrative regard-
ing the nature of those threats is one in which the distinction between internal and 
external security are less meaningful, resulting in cooperation between the High 
Representative and the Commission becoming essential. In particular, the Joint 
Communication highlights that the growing risk is that malicious actors engage in 
combinations of economic, technological, military and diplomatic activities to undermine 
the stability of states and their economies ‘while remaining below the threshold of 
formally declared warfare’ (European Commission and High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 2).
Ideational continuity and path-dependence is apparent in the section of the 
Communication on cybersecurity, which emphasises coordination, coherence and resi-
lience, with an enhanced role for national authorities cooperating with the private sector 
to ensure the resilience of information systems and critical information infrastructures 
(2016, pp. 10–12). Here, we can see that the emphasis remains on the cooperation 
between public and private sector experts, with no distinct change in philosophy or 
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programme, and policies changing by means of gradualist layering; the success of ENISA 
and private-sector cooperation is used as legitimation basis for expanding the ENISA 
mandate and providing for ‘market based’ solutions through the EU Cybersecurity Act 
(Regulation 2019/881 2019). Under this law, cybersecurity ‘experts’ are brought into the 
regulatory sphere by providing accreditation and certification for ICT products, processes 
and services, based on the underlying philosophy that experts are best placed to oversee 
these activities.
Disinformation, however, is presented as a new form of threat, and social media as its 
key dissemination channel. While disinformation in itself is not a new phenomenon, it 
moves from a peripheral concern of the EU to take a central position in its security- 
focused initiatives, initially due to Russia’s expansion of its disinformation campaigns from 
Russia and its periphery in its first and second phases to then focus on disruption and 
destabilisation in Europe in 2014, coinciding with its military incursion into the Ukraine 
(Treverton et al. 2018, 69). The European Council expressed a specific concern over online 
disinformation in this context, urging ‘the High Representative, in cooperation with 
Member States and EU institutions, to prepare by June an action plan’ (European 
Council 2015, 4). It is here that the blending of the approaches coming from historical 
and discursive institutionalism becomes highly pertinent; whereas there is continuity 
coming from historical path-dependences concerning the role of private actors in the 
governance of cybersecurity based in understandings of expertise and aligned interests, 
we see a rupture as the result of an exogenous shock resulting from perceived informa-
tion warfare waged by Russia. In terms of discursive institutionalism, this rupture creates 
an ideational critical juncture, in which the way these private actors are understood is 
subject to a divergence between those actors sharing the EU’s interests (including 
providers of CII security solutions), and those that are deemed not to share the same 
interests, which include certain social media platforms.
Disinformation becomes more prominent in the Commission’s security programme, 
as it becomes identified as being a source of rising instability in the EU, as well as 
presenting threats for effective policy-making in fields such as health and climate 
change (European Commission 2018a). As stated by the Commission, ‘disinformation 
erodes trust in institutions and in digital and traditional media, and harms our democ-
racies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions’ (European 
Commission 2018a, 1), and social media platforms are specifically singled-out for having 
‘failed to act proportionately, falling short of the challenge posed by disinformation and 
the manipulative use of platforms’ infrastructures’ (European Commission 2018a, 2). This 
Communication followed on almost immediately from the ‘Cambridge Analytica’ revela-
tions, in which Facebook allowed for the ‘harvesting’ of millions of users’ data. The 
information gathered was used by Donald Trump’s election campaign, as well as Leave. 
eu in the Brexit referendum campaign, in what was considered one of the biggest data 
breaches on record. Furthermore, Cambridge Analytica-obtained data was implicated in 
the development of targeted disinformation campaigns using conspiratorial ideas 
designed to serve the interests of these campaigns (Venturini and Rogers 2019). While 
Zuckerberg acknowledged this ‘breach of trust’, policymakers have indicated their 
displeasure at the unwillingness of Facebook to effectively combat the spread of 
disinformation on its platform, as well as repeated refusals to attend hearings 
(Waterson 2018). Zuckerberg did attend a European Parliament hearing in the wake of 
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the Cambridge Analytica scandal, where MEPs indicated a deep scepticism regarding 
Zuckerberg’s commitment to tackling disinformation (Madrigal 2018). At the centre of 
this deepening distrust is a perception amongst actors in the EU that many of the US- 
based social media platforms do not share the EU’s values where it comes to freedom of 
expression, with Zuckerberg espousing ‘techno-libertarian’ ideals and stating to the 
European Parliament that Facebook should not regulate what is true or not, represent-
ing a philosophical ideal that all political speech should be permitted with a plurality of 
views being represented (Lischka 2019). A particularly virulent form of disinformation 
being spread through Facebook, ostensibly on the basis of plurality of opinion is that of 
‘anti-vaxxers’, who criticise (often on the basis of conspiracy theories and misrepre-
sented scientific studies) contemporary vaccination programmes, which has been linked 
to the increased transmission of diseases such as measles (Hoffman et al. 2019). This 
approach to speech is not perceived as conforming to EU principles of expression, in 
which speech that is considered to be actively harmful, such as hate speech or glorifica-
tion of terrorism is explicitly illegal and should be actively regulated (see for example 
Ross 2019). This perception resulted in the Commission’s decision to propose 
a Regulation requiring social media to remove material deemed to constitute dissemi-
nation of materials promoting terrorism (European Commission 2018b).
We increasingly see, as a result of this change in trust relationship, a corresponding 
change in underlying philosophy regarding the relationship between public and private 
actors, which impact upon programme and policy-level ideas. The EU’s perceptions of 
democracy and the role of private actors within it is subject to a reorientation; whereas 
some private actors are trusted partners in cybersecurity, and believed to share the values 
of the EU, social media platforms are increasingly framed as being part of the problem, 
with their private sector operators not sharing those same values. At the policy level, this 
becomes reflected in a discourse that no longer places these platforms at the heart of 
policymaking as with other cybersecurity ‘experts’, but rather as agents to be regulated 
through a Commission-developed Code of Practice for tackling disinformation in the 
online environment (European Commission 2018c). In 2019, the Commission is explicit 
in stating that in 2020 it would conduct a review into the effectiveness of social media 
platforms in applying the Code of Practice, and should it find compliance unsatisfactory, it 
would consider alternative means of tackling this policy problem, including regulatory 
oversight (European Commission 2019). In this respect, therefore, ideational change can 
be identified in how private actors are distinguished; those that are trusted, and take part 
in the governance network, and those that are less trusted, and as a result are no longer 
part of that network but instead subject to regulatory oversight by it.
Digital technologies have taken a preeminent policy position under the new Commission 
Presidency, with one stream of the Commission’s agenda named Shaping Europe’s Digital 
Future (European Commission 2020a). The section of the document focused on cybersecurity 
represents the existing trends identified previously and in line with the dominant ideational 
philosophy, in which the necessity of tackling risks and the expertise of the private sector are 
present; the programme proposed is one of expanding the marketisation of cybersecurity 
products and creation of a single market for cybersecurity, with engagement with private 
sector experts and the establishment of a joint Cybersecurity Unit in order to facilitate cohesion 
and coordination (Council of the European Union 2020a, 4). This ideational path-dependence 
and continuity is also demonstrated in policy programmes associated with this agenda, 
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including the European Strategy for Data (European Commission 2020b) and New Industrial 
Strategy for Europe, which proposes increased private sector engagement in cybersecurity 
rules for 5 G (European Commission 2020c). The White Paper on Artificial Intelligence contains 
a section on the use of AI in the context of cybersecurity, reiterating the importance of public- 
private cooperation between AI experts and ENISA in this field, and the possibility of new 
cybersecurity products arising from developments of these technologies (European 
Commission 2020d). Disinformation is not, however, mentioned within the context of the 
Data or Industrial Strategy documents. Instead, disinformation is framed differently in Shaping 
Europe’s Digital Future, where emphasis is placed on the risk posed to democracy from 
disinformation and the need for transparency regarding information manipulation online, 
with the Commission proposing a Democracy Action Plan (Council of the European Union 
2020a, 6). Whereas attacks on information systems and critical information infrastructure are 
presented as being cybersecurity threats, disinformation and information manipulation on 
those systems is presented as not only a cybersecurity threat but a threat to the EU’s 
fundamental order and values. As will be discussed in the next section, these are ideas that 
have been reinforced, rather than challenged, by the current pandemic.
The impact of covid-19 in the trajectory of EU cybersecurity policy: 
reinforcing of existing trends
In this final section of the article, it will be demonstrated that prior to the Covid-19 
outbreak, the trends established in the period 2016–2019 are not subject to an ideational 
challenge, but instead Covid serves to reinforce the existing ideational path-dependency. 
The philosophical framework in cybersecurity, incorporating elements concerning private 
sector expertise and the positive nature of integration, remained consistent. However, at 
the programme level, while some private sector experts are considered best-placed to 
facilitate cybersecurity as a means of combating online risks, the operators of social media 
platforms are no longer considered to share the same world view as the EU on the 
necessity of tackling disinformation. After the Covid-19 outbreak, these trends have 
continued, albeit at an accelerated pace. This suggests that the underlying philosophy 
and programme level understanding that all private sector experts shared similar values 
to the EU in the field of cybersecurity was effectively challenged and had lasting effects. 
Indeed, there are now two discursive path-dependencies in operation, one in which the 
private sector providing cybersecurity is a trusted partner in governing cyberspace, and 
one in which social media platforms pose a challenge to the EU’s security through an 
unwillingness or inability to effectively tackle disinformation, and thus need more 
oversight.
Covid-19 has dominated much of the EU’s programme and policy focus in a very short 
time. By the end of February, the pandemic visibly emerged as the crisis on the EU’s 
agenda (Council of the European Union 2020a). Prior to the outbreak, less than 10% of 
workers in the EU worked from home on a daily basis (with the UK and France having 
approximately 12% and 17% of workers working from home), increasing to 38% by 
April 2020, including more than half the working population in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland and the UK (Eurofound 2020). This increase in home- 
working has been seen as an opportunity for criminal actors online, with Europol report-
ing a significant increase in attacks on information systems, online scams and ransomware 
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attacks (2020). Similarly, disinformation concerning the origins of Covid-19, its effects, the 
response of world governments and indeed the very existence of the virus began to 
spread from January onwards (Lovari 2020). In April 2020, the Commission published 
a Recommendation on a common Union toolbox for the use of technology and data to 
combat and exit from the Covid-19 crisis (Commission Recommendation 2020/518, 2020). 
This Recommendation specified that effective cybersecurity measures would be essential 
to ensure the protection of data used to tackle the crisis, including test-and-trace data. 
Within this Recommendation, the private sector providers of these technologies are 
trusted to ensure the resilience of their systems from data breaches or unauthorised 
access, in cooperation with data protection and health authorities.
Discursively, these private sector actors are part of the cybersecurity governance 
framework, with philosophical and programme level continuity, and policy change taking 
a gradualist layering approach. This theme continues in the ‘Repair and Prepare’ policy 
initiative proposed by the Commission in May (European Commission 2020e), which 
covered a range of different activities to boost economic recovery post-Covid. In the 
field of cybersecurity, private sector actors are presented as contributing both to the 
security of the online environment in Europe, with discussion of their involvement in an 
expanded critical infrastructure protection initiative, as well as being a source of potential 
recovery through the establishment of cybersecurity-oriented Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (European Commission 2020e, 9). At the time of writing, the most recent 
publication with a cybersecurity dimension is the Council Conclusions on the Shaping 
Europe’s Digital Future agenda (Council of the European Union 2020b). These Conclusions 
stress that cybersecurity is an essential contribution to the economy and safety of the EU 
based on principles of resilience and public-private cooperation, encouraging 
a continuation and expansion of these activities, agreeing that ‘acceleration of the digital 
transformation will be an essential component of the EU’s response to the economic crisis 
generated by the Covid-19 pandemic’ (Council of the European Union 2020b, 2).
Responses to disinformation have reinforced the EU’s perception that social media 
platforms do not share the same values or philosophy regarding this divisive form of 
communication. The Council’s Covid-19 risk mitigation strategy emphasised that one 
necessary policy response concerned efforts intended to prevent the spread of disinfor-
mation concerning the virus (Council of the European Union 2020a, 6). This is reiterated in 
the Commission and High Representative’s Communication on the Global EU response to 
Covid-19, where disinformation concerning the virus is discursively framed as a threat to 
the EU’s fundamental values and to its health security (Council of the European Union 
2020a). According to Europol, disinformation concerning the outbreak and response to 
Covid-19 has spread rapidly since the initial outbreak in Wuhan, with alleged sources 
including foreign governments, state-backed actors, political opportunists and criminal 
organisations (2020). In May, the Commission referred to an ‘infodemic’ in which false 
messages, often with a propaganda or hate-based narrative, was being spread. This 
disinformation was framed as being a threat to public health and democracy, with 
a need for immediate action (European Commission 2020e, 15).
The divergent approach to social media platforms is reinforced in the Council 
Conclusions. Here, online platform providers are categorised separately from ‘experts’ 
and ‘national authorities’, with these platforms being presented as part of the disinforma-
tion threat, and the subject of demands ‘for greater transparency and responsibility’ 
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(Council of the European Union 2020c). The Commission and High Representative quickly 
followed the Council Conclusions with a Joint Communication on tackling Covid-19 
disinformation, which again reiterated the nature of disinformation as a significant threat 
to health and democracy. While it states that it is the requirement of a range of actors 
including national authorities, journalists, fact-checkers and platform operators to coop-
erate to identify and tackle disinformation, the narrative concerning platforms is that 
‘platforms have not sufficiently empowered [fact-checkers] during the current public 
health crisis [. . .] there is therefore a need for additional efforts and information sharing, 
as well as increased transparency and greater accountability’ (Council of the European 
Union 2020b, 8). The policy proposals in this area require renewed efforts by platforms to 
work with national authorities and fact-checkers to identify disinformation and its sources, 
as well as disclosing manipulative behaviour being conducted through their platforms 
(Council of the European Union 2020b, 9). In its assessment of the spread of disinforma-
tion, the EEAS noted that while social media platforms had some success in tackling 
disinformation regarding the virus, ‘platforms are still vulnerable to being the tool for viral 
distribution of false information [. . . and] this shows that further and continued efforts by 
the platforms are necessary beyond the Code of Practice’ (EEAS 2020). Furthermore, at the 
release of the Joint Communication, Commission Vice-President for Values and 
Transparency Vera Jourova stated that ‘while online platforms have taken positive steps 
during the pandemic, they need to step up their efforts [. . .] For instance we know only as 
much as platforms tell us – this is not good enough. They have to open up and offer more 
evidence’ (as cited in Lomas 2020). It is not unforeseen that the acceleration of the EU’s 
disinformation programme may ultimately lead to a policy of increased regulation of 
social media, rather than the distinct ‘market-based’ approach being applied to actors in 
other fields of cybersecurity.
At the heart of the divergence in the underlying philosophy and resulting programme 
and policy-level responses of the EU in the field of cybersecurity is the changing under-
standing of the role of private actors in governance. Ultimately, it is due to the trust 
invested in those actors – within the ordoliberal philosophic framework, the private sector 
expert is an active participant in the governance of various policy areas in cooperation 
with EU and national authorities, with the EU best-placed to coordinate action in 
a cohesive and coherent manner. In most domains of cybersecurity, the private sector 
can be trusted to form an effective part of that network and thus contribute to the 
effective security and economic development of the EU, resulting in no significant 
challenge to the path-dependencies that have developed since the origins and formalisa-
tion of EU cybersecurity. For this reason, in most cybersecurity domains, change is of 
a gradual, layering nature. However, the critical juncture that has served to reorient this 
ideational path-dependency was not that of the financial crisis, or even that of the current 
pandemic. Instead, the loss of trust in certain online actors, namely social media platforms, 
is the result of upheavals and global instability (with 2016 being a critical year in this 
changing perception) that EU policymakers consider social media platforms contributed 
to and refuse to accept responsibility for. It is here that we see discursive change, with 
programme and policy level shifts concerning the role of social media platforms in 
tackling disinformation. While all private sector actors can contribute to providing security 
and economic growth to the EU, some are more trusted to do so in line with the EU’s 
fundamental values than others.
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Conclusion
By reframing the development of EU Cybersecurity through the lenses of historical and 
discursive institutionalism, it has been possible to identify the key ideas that have 
produced discursive path-dependencies in this field. Just as importantly, by using this 
approach, it has been possible to better understand the conditions in which ideational 
path-dependency in institutions continues or changes, and how this can impact upon 
programme and policy-level narratives. In the field of cybersecurity, while critical 
junctures have served to facilitate change in underlying ideas that shape programmes 
and policies, they are not necessarily the critical junctures that may be expected. 
Whereas the spread of Covid-19 has been highly destabilising to economies, societies 
and the daily life of public and private actors, it does not appear to have served in itself 
as a critical juncture in the EU’s understanding of cybersecurity. Instead, the pandemic 
has resulted in the existing ideational position that social media providers, rather than 
contributing to effective cybersecurity, are in fact hindering it. Perceiving them as both 
a form of hybrid cybersecurity threat, as well as representing a broader threat to the 
EU’s democratic values, the EU’s position on social media platforms was shaped by an 
earlier critical juncture, in 2016. During this juncture, the discourse concerning the role 
of these platforms in the digital environment was subject to a rhetorical change 
underlining their role in the dissemination of disinformation. The increased spread of 
disinformation concerning Covid-19 in 2020 has provided a basis for policy continuity 
rather than rupture, reinforcing the concerns regarding the role of these platforms as 
a source of insecurity, in comparison to private providers of cybersecurity solutions, 
which are deemed to share the interests and values of the EU. The rise in cyber-attacks 
and increased spread of disinformation during the pandemic, particularly concerning 
the nature of the disease and its origins, has therefore not resulted in a significant shift 
in the EU’s thinking in this field, but instead reinforced its existing perceptions 
regarding the roles of different security providers, and therefore served to ensure 
ideational continuity in its existing policy approaches rather than result in a change 
in them.
More generally, this article highlights that events that on their surface appear to 
‘change everything’, whether the realisation of mass consumer use of the Internet in 
the late 1990s, or indeed the pandemic of 2020, must be carefully assessed in terms 
of the changes they truly instil. While there may be far-reaching and long-standing 
changes to aspects of EU policymaking in fields such as health or migration, as we 
seek to better understand and control the aspects of pandemic response that relate 
to the treatment and movement of people that may be infected with a novel 
coronavirus, in the field of cybersecurity, we do not see the same dramatic change 
in policies, but instead, a reinforcing of existing ideas and attitudes, albeit with 
a renewed impetus and an acceleration of action. The disinformation, and social 
media’s role in its spread, are not new and not unexpected. Instead, the inability or 
unwillingness of social media to effectively suppress it has resulted in a confirmation 
of the pre-existing ideational position of the Commission, resulting in policy 
announcements that pursue previously stated goals rather than constituting 
a dramatic change.
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Notes
1. For the purpose of this article, ideas are understood to mean a set of policy solutions that are 
embedded within a belief system and implemented by actors in decision-making positions, 
which directly shape policy instruments and outcomes, following the identification of policy 
problems and the opening of windows of opportunity for institutional change (Steinmo 
2008).
2. The expression of these ideas, or discourse, is understood as a relational system of signifying 
practices aimed at a given audience, whether the discourse is written, oral, or in any other 
form of communicating meaning (Torfing 1999).
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